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The paper deals with the location of service branches. Consumers can receive service 
from different firms and branches offering substitute services. The consumer chooses 
the firm and the branch. Examples are banking services (which firm and branch?), 
healthcare providers, insurance companies and their agents, brokerage firms and their 
branches. With the change in the accessibility of the internet, the service industry 
witnesses the impact of the change in technology. More customers prefer acquiring 
services over the internet or phone, and less require face to face contacts. The industry 
has to respond in limiting the number of branches. The paper deals with the question 
which branches to close.   
In the first period, each consumer selects to receive service from the branch that 
minimizes the overall costs incurred, composed of price per service plus transportation 
costs. In the second period, the branches’ configuration changes. A branch is closed by 
one of the firms in alternative locations. When consumers switch  a  firm, additional 
costs, “exogenous switching costs” are incurred, the cost of information, learning costs, 
transaction costs.  These costs are incurred by the consumers, and are different from 
“endogenous switching costs” that are incurred by firms, e.g., the ‘frequent flier’ case. 
The paper investigates how the market area and market share of branches and firms 
change with the closure of a branch. The loss varies between no loss to losing the whole 
market. Given the prices, the switching costs and the location, the branches to be closed 
are identified.   2
 
1. Introduction  
The paper deals with the location of service branches. Consumers can receive service 
from different firms and branches offering substitute services. The consumer chooses 
the firm and the branch. Examples are  brokerage firms  (which firm  and branch?), 
insurance companies and their agents, banking services and their branches. The service 
industry witnesses the impact of the change in technology. More customers prefer 
acquiring services over the internet or phone, and less require face to face contacts. The 
industry has to respond in limiting the number of branches. The paper deals with the 
question which branches to close.   
Baron (2002a)  argues that customers don’t switch often between firms, due to the 
existence of  switching costs.    Von Weizsacker (1984) and Klemperer (1987a) 
introduced the term "switching costs" into the economic literature (see also Klemperer, 
1987b, 1995, Padilla, 1995, To, 1996). They assume that a customer incurs costs in 
switching from one firm to another, like ‘learning costs’, ‘transaction costs’, 
‘psychological costs’. The consumer adopts one of the firms in the first period, when 
commodities are offered at different prices. In the second period, if the consumers want 
to switch firms they incur switching costs. The result is that customers are likely to be 
loyal to the firm from which they purchased in the first period. Two cases are analyzed: 
"endogenous switching costs" and "exogenous switching costs". Endogenous switching 
costs exist when firms encourage customers to become loyal by plans like ‘frequent 
flier’. Customers are offered the commodity at a lower price in the second period, if 
they remain loyal to the firm. The firm bears the costs, the foregone revenues.  
If the consumers change a firm, due to the change in the products' prices in the second 
period, the consumers bear ‘exogenous switching costs’. These costs might deter the 
customers from switching firms, and makes them 'captive customers'. Sharpe (1997) 
examined the implications of switching costs on the banking industry; Polsky et al. 
(2000) examined the mobility of practicing physicians.  
In Klemperer’s basic model (and those of his followers) it is assumed that consumers 
enter and exit the market, but firms have a permanent location. Unlike these 
assumptions,  this model reverses the roles and assumes that branches are closed in 
alternative locations, but consumers have a permanent location.    3
As is shown in the paper, it will be to the firm's advantage to close branches located 
adjacent to each other, since the firm will not lose any customer. In closing branches 
between the competitor's branches (or adjacent to them), the firm might lose all its 
customers or retain some (or all) of its customers under certain conditions. Under 
conditions specified in  the  paper, the firm can avoid losing customers, despite the 
closure of a branch. 
Section 2 describes the baseline model – a line with two branches belonging to two 
firms that co-exist in the first period (a Hotelling framework). Section 3 discusses the 
general impact of closing a branch and introduces the terminology. 
Sections 4-5 have propositions regarding the market share of a firm closing a branch 
when prices, switching costs and location vary. Section 4 discusses the case when a 
branch is closed in an edge adjacent to the firm's branch or between two branches of the 
firm. We conclude that a firm should adopt such a policy. Section 5 discusses the case 
when the branch is closed adjacent to its competitor's branches, or between branches of 
two firms (the firm itself and its competitor). Closing a branch might be profitable to the 
firm, under conditions specified in the propositions. Section 6 summarizes the results. 
2. Basic Model – First Period 
Assumptions 
1. The market is represented by a line segment of length 1 [ 0, 1 ], along the line 
customers and service branches are located; 
2. The branches belong to two different firms (H, I); 
{A, B, C} a set of letters designating the location of branches on the line. {a, b, c} the 
respective distances from the origin. For example, location A is in distance a from the 
origin (0<a<1). 
Branches are designated by firm (H, I) and location (a, b, c), HA, HB, HC, IA… 
Only firm H closes branches in the second period. 
3. The branches offer substitute goods; 
4. Branches of different firms charge different f.o.b. prices ( PH, P I in branches 
belonging to firms H and I respectively). Branches belonging to the same firm charge 
the same price. The prices don’t change from one period to another; 
5. No capacity constraints apply to the branches. The marginal costs are constant;   4
6. Consumers are distributed uniformly along the line. A consumer is located at  x 
(0<x<1); 
7. Switching costs, S, are incurred when switching from one firm to another. There are 
no switching costs in switching between branches belonging to the same firm;  
8. When the total costs in two branches are equal, the customers adopt the closer 
branch; 
9. Consumers don’t move-in or move-out of the market;  
10. Demand is inelastic. Each customer purchases one unit per period; 
11. The model is of two periods. 
 
Definitions 
Market area, the boundary of the area from where customers patronize a branch, will be  
designated by [ ]. For a thorough discussion of the law of market areas, see Parr (1995). 
Market share is the size of the market area: upper boundary less lower boundary, will 
be designated by Y. 
) ( Hi x H ˛ Y denotes the market share of firm  H (the closing firm) with respect to the 
customers that in the first period belonged to the branch closed Hi. 
 
The Model 
There are branches in the market (e.g., HA, IB) belonging to firms H, I, where 0<a<b<1. 
Consumers choose a branch that m inimizes the total cost of service. The consumer 
bears the price per service (PH, PI) and the travel cost, since the service is offered in the 
branch (as is true with discussing a loan, consulting a physician, etc.). The travel cost 
equals the distance between the place of residence (x) and the location of the branch (a, 
b) times the cost of travel per distance unit (t); travel costs are independent of the firm 
which provides the service.  
Total Costs, denoted  CSHA, of getting service at branch HA (of firm H located at a), 
when the customer is located at x are: 
CSHA=PH+t‰x-a‰ 
A consumer located at x chooses branch HA if the total cost, CSHA, is smaller than the 
total cost, CSIB, of getting service of branch IB (of firm I located at b).  
CSIB=PI+t‰x-b‰   5
The consumer that is indifferent between the branches, is located at z:  
All consumers with x<z choose branch HA located at a; all consumers with x>z choose 
branch IB located at b.  
Since the price per service is different between the branches, the extreme case is when 
one branch dominates the whole market. If H(I) charges a very low price it will capture 
all the customers.   
 
Proposition 1 
The market has branches from two different firms, only if the following relationship 
between the prices holds: 
 
Proof 
The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that the price firm H charges is below the 
price range: 
By comparing CSHA and CSIB we conclude that for all customers in the segment [0, 1] it 
is      cheaper to get service at HA than at IB, and nobody will get service at IB. To 
exemplify, let us examine a single range which is closer to branch IB: [b, 1] 
CSHA=PH+t(x-a)<[PI-t(b-a)]+t(x-a)=CSIB    b<x<1 
We conclude that firm H controls the whole market, which contradicts the presumption 
regarding the market. 
If the price firm H charges is above the range, it is equivalent to claiming that the price 
firm  I  charges is relatively low, and firm  I  controls the whole market, which is a 
contradiction: 
If the sign turns from inequality to equality, where PH=PI - t(b-a) then: for customers 
residing in the range [0, b] it is cheaper to receive service in  HA and they will adopt 
branch HA. In the market area [b,1] the customers are indifferent between the branches. 
According to assumption 8 (equality between costs) the customers in the range [b,1] 
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If the branches charge the same price, PH = PI = P, then the market area of HA is [0, 
(a+b)/2] and the market area of IB is [(a+b)/2, 1]. Each customer in the range [0, a] will 
adopt branch  HA, each customer in the range [b, 1] will adopt branch branch IB, the 
customers in the range [a, b] are split between the branches. 
If the branches are located at the edges a=0 and b=1 and the prices are equal, then the 
firms split the market area, else the market area will depend on the locations a, b. 
If the branches are located at the edges, and charge different prices, then  HA and IB 
dominates respectively at: 
 
3. Second Period - Closing a Branch  
When a firm closes a branch, the customers are forced to move to another branch. They 
might move to a branch belonging to the same firm, or of another firm. 
Since the customers don’t know the firm’s future policy regarding the opening of new 
branches or closure of branches, it is reasonable to assume that in the first period they 
are myopic, and make decisions disregarding future changes in the availability of 
branches. 
Closing a branch has different implications on branches and on firms. The branch 
closed loses its market area, and consequently its market share. The implications on the 
firm are different. If the customers move to another of the firm's branches, the firm loses 
only some (or none) of its customers. If some of its branches gain customers, the issue 
is the sum of changes in market share (see Section 4). If the customers move to a branch 
of another firm, the firm loses its market share.  
Five propositions are presented and discussed. The detailed proofs appear in Baron 
(2002b). 
In Section 4, cases where the firm closes a branch adjacent to its own branches are 
discussed, either on the edge (Section 4.1) or between two branches (Section 4.2). It is 

















actually increase its profits. These propositions are  trivial, but are brought for 
completeness. 
In Section 5 we examine cases where the closed branch is adjacent to the competitor's 
branches. Moving to the competitor's branches implies that the consumer bears 
switching costs (exogenous switching costs). Under certain conditions the customers 
will move in the second period to remote branches of the ‘closing firm’ from which  
services were purchased in the first period. It is argued, that under specified conditions, 
a non-continuous market area is generated. We explore the impact of the switching costs 
on the shape of the market area (continuous or not) and on the size of the market share. 
Notation 
Firms operating in the first period in different scenarios: 
Hi, where i=A, B,..  G - branches belonging to firm H. 
IA, IB - branches belonging to firm I. 
Branches closed by firm H in the second period: 
HC - A branch in the edge, adjacent to HA. 
HD - A branch between branches HA, HB. 
HE - A branch in the edge, adjacent to IB. 
HF - A branch between branches IA, IB. 
HG - A branch between branches HA, IB. 
 
4. Closing a Branch Adjacent to Incumbent Branches of the Firm  
4.1 A Firm Closes a Branch in the Edge  
Firm H has branches at a and c, branches HA, HC, which share the market with branch 
IB in the first period 0<c<a<b<1. In the second period, firm H closes branch HC in the 




Closing a branch between the firm’s branch and the edge, will not change the firm’s 
market share, but will increase its profits.  The ‘adjacent’ branch will gain all the 
customers of the ‘closing’ branch. . The firm's market share in the range will correspond 
to:   8
 
4.2 A Firm Closes a Branch Between Two Branches of the Same Firm 
We assume that in the first period, the branches within a restricted segment of the 
market  
[a, b] are HA, HB and HD where 0<a<d<b<1. 
The price per service in the three branches is the same. In the second period firm H 
closes the intermediary branch, HD.  
 
Proposition 3 
The market share gained by branches due to the closing of an intermediary branch of the 
same firm, is independent of the location of the ‘closing’ branch and equals half the 
distance between the ‘remaining’ branches. The market share of firm  H remains 
unchanged; closing the branch increases the firm’s profits. 
 
4.3 A Firm Should Close the Branches Adjacent to Other Branches of the Firm 
Though the ‘closing’ branches were profitable, in terms of  the ‘closing’ firm, closing 
the branches will increase the firm's profitability.  
§ The consumers move from one of the firm’s branches to another; 
§ No customers are lost to the firm in the second period; 
§  The firm's revenues remain unchanged (by Assumption 10); 
§  The total costs are lower (by Assumption 5, the variable costs are unchanged, 
since the number of customers is unchanged; the fixed costs of an additional 
branch are saved); 
§  The firm’s profits increase.  
 
The conclusion might change, if Assumption 5 is relaxed, and the capacity of the 
branches is limited or marginal costs are increasing. 
For completeness: switching costs will not change  the propositions, since  by 
assumption, switching costs apply only in switching between firms and not in switching 
between branches of the same firm.  
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5. Closing a Branch Adjacent to Incumbent Branches of a Competitor  
5.1 A Firm Closes a Branch in the Edge, the Adjacent Branch Belongs to a Competitor 
Three branches belonging to two firms are in the market, HA, IB, HE (0<a<b<e<1). 
Firm H closes branch HE. If the customers move to branch IB, the adjacent branch, they 
incur switching costs. Branch HA is more remote. Will firm H lose the market share of 
the ‘closing’ branch,  ) ( HE x H ˛ Y , or under certain conditions retain its share, since the 
customers move to the more remote remaining branch, HA? 
 There is no adjacent branch closer to the edge next to the closing branch, since we 
discuss competition over a line. If we analyzed a circle and the closer branch belonged 
to firm H then see Sec. 5.3. If the branch belonged to the competitor, see Sec. 5.2.  
 
Proposition 4 
A firm closing a branch, in an edge adjacent to  a  competitor’s branch, will lose 
customers as a function of the price charged, the location of its remaining branches and 
the switching costs. The firm's market share in this range will correspond to:  
 
We conclude that if  PH  is relatively high (relative to  PI), the switching costs are 
relatively low and the distance between the potential branches ( b-a) is high,  the 
‘closing firm’ (firm H) will lose all the market share of the closing branch. If the 
customers remain loyal to the closing firm, they move to the more remote branch of the 
firm (branch HA). The result is a non-continuous market share.  
 
5.2  Closing a Branch Between Two Branches of a Competitor 
In the first period, five branches are located within a restricted segment of the market: 
IA,  IB and  HC,  HE,  HF ( 0<c<a<f<b<e<1). The branches divide the market area 
between them in the first period. In the second period, branch HF (belonging to firm H 
and located at f) is closed. If the customers move to the competitor’s branches (IA or 
IB), switching costs apply, since we analyze two different firms. Will they move to 
more remote branches belonging to the ‘closing firm’ (H) and remain loyal to the firm 
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Proposition 5 
The market share of  a firm closing a branch between two branches belonging to a 
competitor depends on the prices, the switching costs and the location of  branches. 
 
The customers’ decision depends on the distance between the potential branches: IA vs. 
HC, IB vs. HE. As the distance is increasing, it is less likely that the firm will keep the 
customers. Other cases that the firm will lose its customers are when the switching costs 
are low and the price the firsm charges is relatively high. As the switching costs are 
higher, it is more likely that the firm keeps the customers. If the customers are loyal to 
the firm, then the resulting market area is non-cotinuous.  
 
5.3 Closing a Branch between Branches of Two Firms 
In the first period branches of different firms co-exist in the market. We concentrate on 
four branches at the range [a, b]: branches HA, HE, HG and IB (0<a<g<b<e<1). In the 
second period the ‘closing  firm’ (H) closes the branch at g (branch HG). Its adjacent 
neighbors are one belonging to the same firm and one to its competitor. We assume that 
switching costs apply when a customer moves his business to the competitor (branch 
IB), switching between firms, and don’t apply when customers move to a branch of the 
same firm (branch HA or branch HE ). 
  
Proposition 6 
The market share of a firm closing a branch between branches of two firms - one 
belonging to a competitor and one to the same firm - depends on  prices, switching costs 
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The firm’s market share is: 
 
 
If the switching costs are high, all the customers will be loyal to the firm, and the firm 
retains its market share as in the first period.  In this case the customers will split 
between the adjacent branch belonging to the ‘closing firm’ and a more remote branch 
(branches HA and HE). Due to the switching costs it is cheaper to get service in HE and 
not in the closer branch IB. This result also depends on the distance e-b. In this case, the 
resulting market area is non-continuous.  
If these conditions do not hold, the firm will lose some of its market share to its 
competitor. Its market area will be continuous. Its market share will depend on the 
distance between the competitor’s branch and the closing branch, b-g . It will increase 
as the switching costs are increasing. 
 
5.4 Should a Firm Close Branches Adjacent to its Competitor's Branches?  
When a firm closes one of its branches adjacent to its competitor’s branches, it is faced 
with the risk of losing the entire market area and market share of this branch. As 
Propositions 4, 5 and 6 show, the loss depends on the difference between the prices 
charged by the firms (PH, PI), the distance between potential branches and the switching 
costs. 
In Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, the customers of the closed branch are faced with a choice 
between two branches (the ‘potential branches’), each with a different cost per service: 
A branch belonging to the competing firm, and an alternative, a  remote  branch 
belonging to the ‘closing firm’.  
If m denotes the location of the branch belonging to firm  H, and n the location of the 
branch belonging to firm I, and m<n<x. The costs of service are: 
CSHm=PH+t(x-m) 
CSIn =PI+S+t(x-n) 
The comparison is equivalent to comparing the costs at the same location, arbitrarily, 
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branch In we shall pay the price the firm charges (PI) plus switching costs (no transfer 
costs), PI+S. 
 The costs relevant for branch Hm equal the price per service (PH) plus the transfer cost 
between the two branches, PH+t(n-m).  
According to Proposition 1, we know that the co-existence of branches in the market 
implies PH+t(n-m)‡ P I.   In the second period, the consumer’s comparison of costs 
includes switching costs, and they may reverse the sign of the inequality. In such a case, 
the more remote branch is adopted by the customers (branch Hm), and not the close 
branch, branch In. 
As long as the switching costs are low, all the customers move from the closing branch 
to its closest neighboring branch.  In Sections 5.1, 5.2,  a branch belonging to the 
competitor, firm I. In these cases, firm H loses its entire market share in the considered 
range. In Section 5.3 the closing firm loses about half of its market share, since one of 
its closest neighbors is a branch belonging to the firm itself. 
Once the distance between the potential branches is relatively small and the switching 
costs  are relatively high, it is likely that the customers will remain loyal to firm H. If 
that is the case, the result is that some of firm  H's branches have a non-continuous 
market area. Some of the customers of these branches belonging to firm  H  reside 
adjacent to the branch (the customers who patronized the branch in the first period), but 
other customers, don't reside adjacent to the branch (the ones who moved in the second 
period from the closing branch). 
The difference between the propositions is in the impact of the switching costs. In 
Proposition 4, the change in market share is not continuous. For a wide range of values 
of the switching costs, firm H will lose all the customers of the closing branch. Once, 
the switching cost is above a 'critical value' the firm retains all its customers. The 
'critical value' depends on the travel cost between the potential branches. Therefore, 
either firm H loses all the customers of the closing branch or it retains all of them. In 
Propositions 4, the results are independent of the location of the closing branch. 
In Propositions 5 and 6, the impact of the switching costs is more gradual. If one of the 
competitor's branches is attractive enough, the boundary between the market areas 
depends on the switching costs. The market area gained by the competitor depends 
negatively on the switching costs.    13
In Propositions 5 and 6 the market share lost or retained depends on the location of the 
closed branches. The market share depends on the distance between the closing branch 
and the adopted branch (e.g., in Proposition 6, b-g). 
 If the firm loses all its customers, its profit will decrease in the second period, assuming 
the branch was profitable in the first period. As the firm retains more of the customers 
of the closed branch, its profits are more likely to increase. The firm saves the branch's 
fixed costs, and its revenues might be close to the initial level (in the first period). 
6. Conclusions  
The service industry witnesses changes. Face to face contacts are less crucial. The 
branches are losing many of their customers, and firms’ survival depends on closing 
service branches. Though the analysis assumed inelastic demand for services, we can 
infer from the analysis into the real world. 
A firm trying to increase its profits should close all the branches adjacent to other 
branches of the firm, according to Propositions 2 and 3. When closure of branches 
adjacent to the competitor’s branches is considered, the Propositions suggest rules for 
choosing the branches to be closed. The propositions identify branches that their 
potential decrease in market share is minimal, e.g., the case where the competitor's 
branch is adjacent to one of the firm's branches.   
The discussion shows the importance of switching costs in the decision to switch a firm 
and in the size of the resulting market share.  The discussion  assumes that switching 
costs are exogenous: the consumer bears the switching costs. We can reformulate the 
problem and assume both exogenous and endogenous switching costs. The consumer 
continues to bear the costs and inconvenience of switching a firm. However, the firm 
that wishes to retain (or attract) the old customers offers a bonus to any customer who 
moves to its branches when a branch is closed, and is willing to bear endogenous 
switching costs. Each firm can use the bonus to increase its market share, if it is willing 
to bear the costs. 
Though  it is assumed that the transfer rate, t, is the same for both firms, we receive a 
non-continuous market area, a result Parr (1995) receives only when the transfer costs 
applying to two firms are different. This results from consumers’ loyalty and is an 
unexpected result. 
   14
The results show that switching costs have an important role in changing the market 
areas and shares. They can be used by  firms to increase their profits, and cannot be 
neglected. 
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Nomenclature 
Y  Market share 
[ ]  Market area 
A, B, C  Location 
CS  Cost of service 
H, I  Types of firms (i= H, I) 
HA, HB, HC, IA, IB…  Branches of firm i, location j (i=H, I; j=A, B, C) 
PI, PH  Price charged by firm i  
S  Switching costs incurred in moving between firms 
t  Price of travel per distance unit 
z  The border between market areas  
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